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ARGUMENT

MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING THE TERMS OF THE
CONTRACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The trial court's basis for granting summary judgment for
Mr. Eardley is succinctly stated in its Conclusions of Law No. 4:
The evidence amply demonstrates that the
conduct alleged by plaintiff
is equally
referable to a series of six contracts each
having a duration of one year as it is to a
single contract for a term of more than one
year.
(emphasis added)

The

very

language

of

the

finding

demonstrates

the

existence of a material question of fact, i.e., what was the term
of the plaintiff's contract, renewable yearly (as claimed by Mr.
Eardley) or open ended with no ending date
Clayton)?

(as claimed by Mr.

If indeed, as the trial court states in said Conclusion

of Law, Mr. Clayton's conduct shows a series of one year contracts
as equally as it shows one contract for more than one year, the
material

fact question

is self evident.

And

if the

evidence

appears to support either proposition equally, the issue should be
left for trial.
each

side

Thus the very existence of that question, with

alleging

by

affidavit

precludes summary judgment.

1

the

opposite

of

the

other,

The question of fact is material since if the parties had
only one contract with no ending date, then all of plaintiff's
conduct necessarily related only to that single multi-year contract
and the part performance exception of the Statue of Frauds clearly
applies.

If, however, it is a series of yearly contracts then his

conduct

relates to more than one contract and, according to Mr.

Eardley's reasoning, defeats the part performance exception.
A contract admittedly exists between the parties, only
the terms
claiming

thereof
different

are

in question.

terms

of

the

(R.24, 25) With each

oral

contract

the

question

naturally arises, who is right, Mr. Clayton or Mr. Eardley?
decision of whose version

side

The

of the oral contract's terms is correct

is logically material to solving the dispute.

Hence, the fact

question is material to the issues at hand.
Indeed, Mr. Eardley's own arguments show that a material
fact question exists.

For example, on page 6 of his brief he

states his postulate that, Clayton's buying of the tickets is not
exclusively referable to an alleged contract then states,
Just as likely, Eardley merely offered, on six
different occasions, to sell season and
playoff tickets to Clayton, which separate
offers Clayton accepted from 1989 to 1994. In
this
scenario, there were
actually
six
contracts, each lasting one season
rather

2

than one continuous contract
Clayton. (emphasis added)

Such language as

u

just as likely" and

u

alleged

by

in this scenario" and to

accompanying argument is not that of a case where fact questions
are settled, but are the language and argument of uncertainty as to
which it is, one contract or more than one contract.
Likewise in point III, on page 8 of Mr. Eardley's brief,
in

attempting to defeat plaintiff's claims that material fact

questions exist, actually admits that they do:
Any factual questions go only to whether there
was one indefinite contract between Clayton
and Eardley or whether or there were six new
contracts.
(emphasis added)
This is the same unresolved fact questions that Clayton raises and
shows

that

Clayton

and

Eardley

both

believe

a

fact

question

remains.
Summary judgment was inappropriate because, viewing the
facts in a light most favorable to him as required by law, (i.e.
that there was only one contract and Mr. Clayton performed under it
for six years) shows a valid claim of part performance sufficient
to remove the contract from the Statue of Frauds.

The question of

whether the contract was one for years or a series of one year
contracts is a

the material question of fact which should defeat

3

Mr. Eardley's summary judgment motion.

Summary judgment is proper

only when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 56 (c); Higgins

v. Salt

Lake

County,

855 p.2d

231 (Utah 1993) . The trial court erred in applying the law of part
performance and incorrectly held there were no disputed issues of
material fact.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Eardley basis his argument on the premise that the
Court

found

it

equally

likely

that

there

were

six

one

year

contracts as there was one multi-year contract, therefore, Mr.
Clayton cannot claim part performance.
Mr.

Clayton's performance

contract.

"exclusively

referable"

to a

However, the entire argument of Mr. Eardley only goes to

demonstrate
precluding

is not

He reasons that therefore,

that there was indeed a material question of fact
summary

judgment:

whether

or

not

separate contracts or one multi-year contract.

there

were

six

If there was only

one multi-year contract Mr. Clayton's performance could only be
attributed to that contract.
then

his

conduct

would

be

If there was more that one contract,
attributed

to

several

contracts.

However, either way that question is answered, it raises a material
question of fact that precluded summary judgment.

The facts looked

at in a light most favorable to Mr. Clayton show that summary
4

judgment was improper and that the decision of the trial court
should be reversed.
DATED this

( '

day of March, 1996.
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE
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